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Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism

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Case 50-1
US and UN v. North Korea (1950–: Korean War)

Case 93-1
US and UN v. North Korea
(1993– : nuclear proliferation)

| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Response to Target Country |
Attitude of Other Countries | Legal Notes | Economic Impact | Assessment |
Author's Summary | Bibliography |

Economic Impact

Observed Economic Statistics

Case 50-1
US and UN v. North Korea (1950–: Korean War)

North Korea: Foreign trade and national income, selected years (millions of dollars except as noted)
Year	Exports	Imports	National income (1946 = 100)
1946	n.a.	n.a.	100
1949	76.3	106.0	209
1953	31.0	42.0	145
1954	29.0	39.3	n.a.
1955	45.0	60.3	n.a.
1956	65.8	74.5	319
1957	100.0	114.8	n.a.
n.a. = not available Source: Chung 1974, 105, 146–47.

“. . . during the Korean War . . . normal foreign trade activities either nearly ceased or slowed down considerably. . . .” (Chung 1974, 104)

Impact of war on North Korean economy is illustrated by fact that by end of conflict “the output of steel and rolled steel was only 2.5 and 3.0 percent, respectively, that of 1949.” (Chung 1974, 106)

Until mid-1960s, USSR and China were North Korea's principal trading partners, accounting for about 90 percent of total trade. “Since the mid-1960s the proportion has been gradually declining owing to expanding North Korean trade with the non-Communist world, especially with Japan and Western Europe.” (Chung 1974, 108)

USSR extends credit of 212 million rubles (repayable at 2 percent interest starting in 1952) to North Korea to cover Soviet imports from 1949–52. (Chung 1974, 118)

“According to an agreement concluded in September 1953, North Korea received a grant totaling 1 billion rubles (U.S. $250 million) from the Soviet Union for the express purpose of aiding North Korea's efforts to reconstruct. . . . The full amount of the grant was to be received within a two-year period. . . .” (Chung 1974, 118)

North Korea, China sign treaty in 1953 in which Chinese write off North Korean war debts (about $114 million), agree to provide North Korea about $325 million in reconstruction aid, 1954–57. (Chung 1974, 122)

In 1949–62 North Korea receives total of $1.37 billion in grants and loans from USSR ($557 million), China ($517 million), other Communist countries ($296 million). (Chung 1974, 142)

Calculated Economic Impact (annual cost to target country)
Decline in North Korean GNP; welfare loss estimated at 20 percent of drop in GNP, 1949–53.	$42 million
Offsets Forgiveness of North Korean war debts to China; welfare gain valued at 80 percent of total debts written off.	($30 million)
Soviet trade credits to North Korea, 1949–52; welfare gain estimated at 20 percent of face value of credits	($4 million)
Total	$8 million

Relative Magnitudes
Gross indicators of North Korean economy
	North Korean GNP (1949 est.)	$684 million
	North Korean population (1949)	9.6 million
Annual effect of sanctions related to gross indicators
	Percentage of GNP	1.2
	Per capita	$0.83
North Korean trade with US as percentage of total trade
	Exports (1949) (authors' estimate)	20
	Imports (1949) (authors' estimate)	20
Ratio of US GNP (1949: $258.3 billion) to North Korean GNP (1949: $684 million)		378

Case 93-1
US/UN v. North Korea
(1993– : nuclear proliferation)

“The largest single source of hard currency, apparently, is the North Korean community in Japan, which sends anywhere from $600 million to $2 billion per year in cash to Pyongyang annually. Much of the cash reportedly is carried in suitcases and plastic bags on the twice-a-month ferry from Niigata by Japanese North Koreans going to visit family members in North Korea.” (New York Times, 1 November 1993; Journal of Commerce, 20 June 1994, 7A; Washington Post, 7 June 1994, A13)

“North Korean trade has been declining since 1991. One reason is that Russia, Pyongyang’s major trading partner, has been reluctant to trade with North Korea unless and until the North pays in hard currency. For a similar reason, Pyongyang’s trade with China has also become sluggish.” (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1996)

“Experts in Seoul and Washington argue that even if China, which provided 72% of North Korea’s food imports, 75% of its oil imports and 88% of the coal needed for its steel production in 1993, would support UN sanctions, sanctions would only have a limited impact. China’s northeastern provinces would continue to provide aid to North Korea and trade with it because the provincial authorities rather than Beijing make the decisions relating to trade, investment and joint ventures in northeastern China.” (Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 February 1994, 22–23)

“North Korean arms exports generate an estimated $50 million per year in hard currency receipts.” (Washington Post, 15 June 1994, A32)

“In 1965, South Korea’s gross national product (GNP) was only 1.6 times larger than North Korea’s. In 1994, however, South Korea’s GNP amounted to US $376.9 billion, approximately 17.8 times larger than North Korea’s US $21.2 billion. South Korea’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 7.5 percent in real terms for the five years, 1990 through 1994; North Korea’s economy registered a negative rate of growth for each of the same five years.” (Korean Overseas Information Service, 1996)

“As of January 1998, net blocked North Korean assets in the US amount to $22.2 million.” (OFAC, Terrorist Assets Report, January 1998, 6)

“Because of Korea’s strong political ideology emphasizing self-reliance, US export sanctions have generally had a minimal effect on US exports. In the absence of the US embargo, some United States industries (vehicles, machinery, chemicals) could have potential export sales of up to $50 million a year, as determined by current trade with European suppliers.” (Bureau of Export Administration, Annual Report 1997, III-42)

North Korea: Foreign trade by source (millions of dollars)
		Exportsa						Importsa
		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
USSR/ FSUb		891	1047	563	n.a.	n.a.		1641	1668	858	n.a.	n.a.
China		167	142	85	154	297		399	403	524	541	600
Japan		268	271	284	n.a.	n.a.		216	194	223	n.a.	n.a.
A. Subtotal		1326	1460	932	n.a.	n.a.		2256	2265	1605	n.a.	n.a.
B. All Sources		1686	1857	1240	916	1020		2905	2930	2280	1500	1620
A/B		78.6	78.6	75.2	n.a.	n.a.		77.7	77.3	70.4	n.a.	n.a.
a. The data for 1992 and 1993 are from a different source and thus may not be completely consistent with earlier years. b. The collapse of the Soviet Union further complicates the problems in compiling consistent, reliable data on the North Korean economy. Among other things, the exchange rate of the ruble has depreciated significantly and some sources suggest that the drop-off in trade with Russia when valued in dollars was even greater than indicated in the table. An article by JETRO researcher Dr. Murooka Tetsuo presents data showing two-way trade between North Korea and Russia of only $1,142 million in 1990 and $365 million in 1991 ("The Future of North Korea Trade in Agricultural Products," Vantage Point, vol. XVI, no. 3 (March): 1–20). Sources: For 1989–91, JETRO and South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as reported in Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit., p. 88; for 1992–93, the Central Bank of the Republic of Korea, as reported in the Journal of Commerce, June 20, 1994, 1A, 7A.

North Korea: Actual and “natural” trade share with other countries
	Actual trade share (percent)			"Natural" trade share (percent)
China	26		South Korea	35
Japan	18		Japan	30
Russia	11		China	13
Iran	9		United States	7
Rest of World	36		Rest of World	15
Memorandum: Share of total trade in GDP	15			71
Source: Noland (1995, 74).

“North Korea’s economy shrank throughout the 1990s as drought and floods helped trigger near-famine conditions and aid dried up from the former Soviet Unions after it dissolved in 1991.” (Financial Times, 5 April 2000, 4)

“North Korea appears to be emerging from a prolonged severe famine with the help of international food aid, but four terrible years of hunger from 1995 through 1998 may have cost the country two million to three million lives, according to accumulating evidence gathered by a range of experts.” (New York Times, 20 August 1999, A6)

“According to some estimates, as many as two millions people may have died of starvation and famine-related disease. Under these circumstances, economic aid and the remittances of Koreans living in Japan, and more recently, receipts from a booming, if tightly controlled, tourist trade with South Korea have become vital sources of income for the Government of President Kim Jong Il.” (New York Times, 25 September 1999, A7)

“Before the 1998 missile launching, Japan supplied North Korea with 5000,000 pounds of rice and a $500,000 contribution to the United Nations aid organizations in 1995; $6 million to international aid agencies like the World Food Program in 1996; and $27 million to the food program and $841,389 in medical assistance to the International Red Cross in 1997, according to the Foreign Ministry.” (New York Times, 26 August 1999, A9)

“Japan has discussed ending financial backing for the nuclear power plant, and political pressure has risen sharply on Japan to suspend lucrative remittances by Koreans living in Japan. Estimates of the value of the remittances range from $250 million to $600 million a year.” (New York Times, 7 September 1999, A6)

Sources estimate that under cruise ship deal with North Korea “Hyundai [who arrange the tours has] so far paid North Korea $166 million for the tourism rights, and has promised $942 million over five years.” (Washington Post, 23 August 1999, A10)

“In recent years, South Korea has tried trade diplomacy of its own, with limited success. Two-way exchanges totaled $383 million in 1997, but declined to $220 million last year.” (Washington Post, 18 September 1999, A16)

“A second test-launch also would jeopardize what North Korea has gained so far from the international community. The North has received $1.4 billion worth of international food aid in the past four years.” (Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 September 1999, 20)

“North Korea earns about $1 billion a year from its missile sales, and has asked to U.S. for compensation if that source of income were cut off.” (Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 September 1999, 32)

“Suspension of oil would worsen North Korea’s already chronic electricity shortage. US oil provides between 15 and 30 per cent of the fuel used in the country’s power stations.” (Financial Times, 15 November 2002, 2)

“The suspension of oil deliveries may have far less of an effect than anticipated. Peter Hayes, director of the Nautilus Institute, …said his agency estimated that American-supplied fuel may provide only about 2 percent of the country’s energy.” (New York Times, 23 November 2002, A11)

“The White House has … moved to choke of KEDO funding for the current fiscal year [2003]. The administration requested $75 million for the organization last February. But Congress has yet to pass the fiscal year 2003 appropriations bill for foreign assistance and in recent discussions with congressional appropriators the administration has asked that the amount be reduced to $3.5 million, just enough to cover the U.S. share of administrative expenses, according to State Department official and congressional aides.” (Wall Street Journal, 4 February 2003, A8)

Average cost of heavy fuel oil, 1995–2002 (dollars per metric ton)
1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
83	121	108	83	104	180	142	162
Source: CRS 2003, KEDO.

US assistance to North Korea, 1995–2005 (millions of dollars)
FY	Food aid	Medical supplies	KEDO assistance (including fuel oil)		Total
1995	0	0.2	9.5		9.7
1996	8.3	0	22		30.3
1997	52.4	5	25		82.4
1998	72.9	0	50		122.9
1999	222.1	0	65.1		287.2
2000	74.3	0	64.4		138.7
2001	102.8	0	74.9		177.6
2002	82.4	0	90.5		172.9
2003	25.5	0	2.3		27.8
2004	52.8	0.1	0		52.9
2005	7.5	n.a.	n.a.		n.a.
Total	701	5.3	403.7		1,102.40
Source: CRS 2003, 1; CRS 2006, 2; White House Press Release, Presidential Determination regarding KEDO Funding, 15 September 2003.

Food aid to North Korea, by donor, 1995–2003 (millions of US dollars)
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003a
South Korea
Through United Nations	0.2	3.5	25.3	10.9	–	0.5	15.8	16.2	19.2
Total	–	3.4	25.5	27.8	38.5	0.5	68.5	82.0	19.2
Korean government figureb	232.3	4.6	47.2	31.9	46.9	113.8	135.4	–	–
United States
Through United Nations	0.2	7.2	45.4	171.9	160.7	29.2	102.7	63.5	31.1
Total	–	9.1	57.4	173.1	160.7	29.2	102.7	63.5	31.1
US government figurec	0.2	8.3	52.4	72.9	222.1	74.3	102.8	82.4	–
European Uniond
Through United Nations	4.0	2.6	49.7	16.3	15.2	4.8	12.4	12.4	21.4
Total	–	11.9	68.0	53.3	17.5	14.3	17.9	29.4	22.0
Japan
Through United Nations	0.1	6.0	27.0	–	–	95.7	104.9	–	–
Total	–	6.0	27.0	–	–	95.7	104.9	–	–
Total
Through United Nations	–	34.4	158.4	215.9	189.9	153.1	248.0	120.7	78.7
Total	272.4	50.3	292.5	335.1	235.9	153.7	375.2	261.4	82.1
a. Through April 27. b. The South Korean Ministry of Unification figures include both public and private food and non-food assistance. They do not included payments made prior to the 2000 North-South summit or other official meetings, however, and as a consequence the figures may understate the true magnitude of South Korean assistance. See Noland 2003, footnote 11. c. The annual figures derived from the UN system and those derived from USAID and US Department of Agriculture differ for a number of reasons. The United States uses a fiscal year, whereas beginning in 1998, the UN system uses a calendar year; the United States dates the contribution when it is disbursed, while the WFP dates it when it is pledged. For further details see Noland 2003, footnote 11. d. European Union includes the donations from the European Commission and member countries. Source: Noland (2003).

Funding appeal by UN World Food Program (WFP) for North Korea (millions of dollars)
	Requirements	Contributions	Percentage of requirements met
1999	141.6	177.7	100.0
2000	106.3	98.3	92.5
2001	315.9	220.0	69.6
2002	216.7	189.0	87.2
2003	202.7	117.8	58.1
2004	172.3	118.9	69.0
Source: United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Summary of Requirements and Contributions by Appealing Organization, various issues. www.reliefweb.int/appeals/index.html

Calculated economic impact (annual costs to target country)
Phase I: (1993–94) None since sanctions threatened but not imposed
Phase II: (2002–2006) Suspension of oil shipments following the revelation of uranium program; welfare loss calculated at 90 percent of reduced shipments based on average cost per metric ton in 2001 and 2002.	$68.4 million
Suspension of food aid; welfare loss calculated at 100 percent of shortfall in percentage of WFP requirements met compared with 1999–2002 average.	$59.2 million
Total	$127.6 million

Relative magnitudes
Gross indicators of North Korean economy
	GNP (1991 est.)a	$22.5 billion
	Population (1991)	20.2 million
	GNP (2002 est.)a	$22.3 billion
	Population (2001)	22.5 million
Annual effect of sanctions on gross indicators
	Percentage of GNP	nil
	Per capita	nil
	Percentage of GNP	0.6
	Per capita	$5.67
North Korean trade with the UN as percentage of total trade
	Exports (1991)	100
	Imports (1991)	100
	Exports (2002)	100
	Imports (2002)	100
Ratio of UN GNPb (1991: $15,963 billion) to North Korean GNP		709
Ratio of UN GNPb (2002: $25,951 billion) to North Korean GNP		1164
a. On a purchasing power basis, estimates vary widely. b. The figure used to estimate the sender countries’ GNP is the sum of the GDPs of all OECD countries. Source: OECD, National Accounts, Comparative Tables, Vol. 2004, release 2, www.sourceoecd.com; CIA, World Factbook 2003.

 

Assessment

Joseph Sang-hoon Chung
“. . . the trade embargo imposed by the United States and other Western nations which went into effect during the Korean War had severely curtailed North Korean trade with some of the important potential trade nations of the non-Communist world including Japan.” (Chung 1974, 109)

Jessica Mathews
"A country that has followed a policy of strict economic self-sufficiency for several decades is not a prime candidate for the application of economic sanctions…. What little we know about North Korean thinking strongly suggests that before Pyongyang peacefully succumbed to economic coercion it would have turned to its million-man army." (Washington Post, 30 October 1994, C7)

Leon V. Sigal
“While the North has held open its nuclear option as leverage for cooperation, it has been punctilious in observing the letter of the Agreed Framework, as demonstrated, for instance in the ‘canning’ of spent fuel rods at Yongbyon. Classified intelligence no doubt shows North Korea engaging in activities that concern decision-makers, but it is critical to distinguish between a threat to break the Agreed Framework and actually breaking it.” (Sigal 1998b)

William Perry
“The Agreed Framework of 1994 succeeded in verifiably freezing North Korean plutonium production at Yongbyon—…without the Agreed Framework, North Korea could have produced enough additional plutonium by now for a significant number of nuclear weapons. Yet, despite the critical achievement of a verified freeze on plutonium production at Yongbyon under the Agreed Framework, the policy review team has serious concerns about possible continuing nuclear weapons-related work in the DPRK.” (“Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations”. Unclassified Report by Dr. William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State. Washington, October 12, 1999)

Congressional report, November 1999
“While North Korea’s nuclear program at its Yongbyon and Taechon facilities appears to be frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, there is significant evidence that other nuclear weapons developments activity is continuing.” (p. 8)

Susan Shirk
“Kim’s decision in the 1990s to violate the Framework Agreement and continue with a nuclear program reflected his understanding of the world at that time: If he were able to keep the program secret, he would strengthen his deterrence against an American or South Korean attack. If the Americans or the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors found out about the program, he would trade it away (or pretend to do so) in exchange for aid. Why should we think Kim’s 2002 decision to reveal the nuclear program is any different?… What’s different is that Kim has a domestic program that cannot succeed without help from the United States, South Korea and Japan… He could build nukes without us, but he cannot build an economy without us.” (Washington Post, 22 October 2002, A27)

James A. Baker III
“…North Korea now admits it has a secret program to develop nuclear weapons. …This is exceedingly dangerous and enormously troubling. What it is not, however, is surprising. Rather, it is the natural and foreseeable result of the 1994 Framework Agreement, the United States turned a policy based on strength into one based on accommodation, compromise, and appeasement... our policy of carrot and sticks had given way overnight to one of carrots only—fuel oil to help run North Korea’s beleaguered economy, two new nuclear reactors and diplomatic ties. Moreover, Pyongyang was given another five years to do what it had already agreed to do in 1991—allow a full inspection of its nuclear facilities. This agreement…in the end, in my view, proved to be a mistake that has made stability on the Korean peninsula less, not more, likely.” (Washington Post, 23 October 2002, A27)

Anthony Lake and Robert Gallucci
“In 1993, as since, it was the judgment of our intelligence agencies that North Korea likely had one or possibly two nuclear weapons, manufactured from plutonium produced some years earlier. President Clinton therefore decided that it was vital not to allow the North to produce more plutonium. This we did. The Agreed Framework we negotiated secured the spent fuel they held in storage (enough plutonium for five nuclear weapons), and all other plutonium-producing facilities were frozen under inspection. Had these facilities been allowed to become operational, North Korea would by now be producing enough plutonium for 30 nuclear weapons a year. ...Now Pyongyang has revealed that it more recently initiated a dangerous, secret uranium enrichment program. It is true that the Agreed Framework did not create a new, comprehensive inspection regime that could have prevented this. We would have to rely on our own intelligence in this regard. But this would have been the case without the agreement. And the deal did at least give us new leverage. . . .Simply put, the Agreed Framework was never based on trust. It was designed to leave us in a better position no matter what the North did. And so we are.”

“Nobody in 1994, and probably few today, expect international sanctions alone to stop a North Korean nuclear weapons program. The Chinese, and perhaps others, would provide enough aid to prevent sanctions from starving the North into submission. Using the threat of sanctions and isolation can, however, force the North to see the wisdom of a negotiated halt.” (Washington Post, 6 November 2002, A21)

Author's Summary

Case 50-1
US and UN v. North Korea (1950–: Korean War)

Overall assessment
Impairing military potential
Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success)	2
Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (negative) to 4 (significant)	2
Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution), scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success)	4
Regime change
Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success)	1
Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (negative) to 4 (significant)	1
Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution), scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success)	1
Political and economic variables
Companion policies: J (covert), Q (quasi-military), or R (regular military)	R
International cooperation with sender, scaled from 1(none) to 4 (significant)	4
International assistance to target: A (if present)	A
Cooperating international organizations	–
Sanction period (years)	56+
Economic health and political stability of target, scaled from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong)	2
Presanction relations between sender and target, scaled from 1 (antagonistic) to 3 (cordial)	1
Type of sanction: X (export), M (import), F (financial)	X,M,F
Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss)	2

Comments
Scoring is based on the outcome of the war and not hostile relations since 1953 including nuclear proliferation.

Case 93-1
US/UN v. North Korea
(1993– : nuclear proliferation)

	Phase I	Phase II
Overall Assessment
Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success)	3	1
Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (negative) to 4 (significant)	3	1
Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution)	9	1
Political and economic variables
Companion policies: J (covert), Q (quasi-military), R (regular military)	Q	Q
International cooperation with sender, scaled from 1 (none) to 4 (significant)	3	3
International assistance to target: A (if present)	–	–
Sanction period (years)	1	4+
Economic health and political stability of target, scaled from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong)	1	1
Presanction relations between sender and target, scaled from 1 (antagonistic) to 3 (cordial)	1	1
Type of sanction: X (export), M (import), F (financial)	–	X, F
Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss)	2	1

Comments

Our scoring of the policy result in phase 1 reflects the success of the Agreed Framework in shutting down the Yongbyon research reactor and freezing North Korea’s nuclear reprocessing capability for nearly a decade. Sanctions appear to have contributed modestly to this outcome, while the carrots included in the framework agreement were at least as important. This case is thus scored an overall modest success, despite the apparent efforts by North Korea to undercut the agreement by developing a uranium enrichment capability, because of the value of the framework agreement in blocking the surer and quicker reprocessing path to North Korean development of nuclear weapons.

Phase II is scored as a failed policy to which sanctions contributed negatively because it resulted in North Korea abandoning the framework agreement and potentially reprocessing enough nuclear waste into plutonium for several nuclear weapons.

Bibliography

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1994. Chronology of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Unpublished. Washington.

Central Intelligence Agency. 1995. The World Factbook: 1994. Washington.

Chung, Joseph Sang-hoon. 1974. The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

CRS (Congressional Research Service). 2002. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program. By Larry A. Niksch. CRS report IB91-141, updated. Washington: Library of Congress (21 October).

CRS (Congressional Research Service). 2003, 2006. U.S. Assistance to North Korea. By Mark E. Manyin and Ryun Jun. Report to Congress RL31785, updated. Washington: Library of Congress (17 March, 31 January).

Doxey, Margaret P. 1980. Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Dulles, Foster Rhea. 1972. American Policy Toward Communist China. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Evans, Paul M. 1985. Sanctions Against the People's Republic of China. In The Utility of Economic Sanctions, ed. David Leyton-Brown. London: Croom Helm.

Garson, John R. 1971. The American Trade Embargo Against China. In China Trade Prospects and US Policy, ed. Alexander Eckstein. New York: Praeger.

Hwang, Eui-Gak . 1993. The Korean Economies. Oxford.

Koo, Bon-Hak . 1992. Political Economy of Self-Reliance: Juche and Economic Development in North Korea: 1961–1990. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea.

Noland, Marcus. 1995. The North Korean Economy. APEC Working Paper Series, Number 95-5. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Noland, Marcus. 2003. Famine and Reform in North Korea. Working Paper 03-5. Washington: Institute for International Economics (July).

Ono, Kyoko. 1999. Turning Sticks to Carrots: US Economic Sanctions Against North Korea. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Leeds, School of International, Development and European Studies (August).

Perry, William. 1999. Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. Unclassified Report by Dr. William J. Perry, US North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State. Washington, October 12.

Sigal, Leon V. 1998a. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sigal, Leon V. 1998b. Averting a Train Wreck with North Korea. Arms Control Today (November/December). Available online at www.armscontrol.org/ACT/novdec98/sigal98.htm.

GAO (US General Accounting Office). 1998. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difficulties in Accomplishing IAEA’s Activities in North Korea. GAO/RCED-98-210, July.

US House of Representatives. 1999. Congressional Report on North Korean Threat. House North Korean Advisory Group Report. Washington, November.

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