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Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism

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Case 50-1
US and UN v. North Korea (1950–: Korean War)

Case 93-1
US and UN v. North Korea
(1993– : nuclear proliferation)

| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Response to Target Country |
Attitude of Other Countries | Legal Notes | Economic Impact | Assessment |
Author's Summary | Bibliography |

Goals of Sender Country

25 June 1950, excerpts from UN resolution
The Security Council, “Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, “Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

	“1.	Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of
North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.
	“2.	Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea (a) to communicate its fully
considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay; (b) to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; (c) to keep the Security Council informed on the execution of the resolution.
	“3.	Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the
execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.” (New York Times, 26 July 1950, A4)

30 June 1950
White House “stated that in keeping with the Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders President Truman had (1) authorized the U.S. Air Force to ‘conduct missions on specific targets in Northern Korea . . . wherever militarily necessary’; (2) ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast; and (3) authorized General MacArthur to use certain supporting ground units in Korea. . . . The President . . . had emphasized that the U.S.A. was ‘not at war’ but was engaged in ‘police action against a bunch of bandits.’” (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950–52: 10807)

1953
“With the Korean cease-fire the justification for a large-scale embargo became less compelling in the eyes of most but not all of the participants. American officials, for example, claimed that the cessation of hostilities did not mean the war was at an end or the need for vigilance less precipitous.” (Evans 1985, 9)

Authors' note
Unaffected even by progressive elimination of controls on trade with China since the early 1980s, the US embargo on trade with North Korea has continued unchanged until hostilities between North Korea and the United States flared up again in the context of nuclear proliferation.

United States

Lynn E. Davis, US Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, 3 March 1994:
“Our objectives in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue are a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a strong non-proliferation regime.... That means North Korea must agree to:

• Full D.P.R.K. membership in the NPT;
• Full cooperation with the IAEA in implementing fullscope safeguards, including special inspections and other measures to clear up the discrepancies in the D.P.R.K.’s past declaration; and
• Full implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, which bans uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities and provides for bilateral inspection regime.”

President George W. Bush
“I have directed my national security team to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile program and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture.. . . If North Korea responds affirmatively and takes appropriate action, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.” (White House Press Release, Statement by the President, 6 June 2001)

“The United States has broader concerns regarding the DPRK as well. The DPRK counterfeits our currency; traffics in narcotics and engages in other illicit activities; threatens the ROK with its army and its neighbors with its missiles; and brutalizes and starves its people. The DPRK regime needs to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct.” (The White House, National Security Strategy 2006)

United Nations

UN Security Council, 31 March 1994
“The Council calls upon the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] to allow the IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and DPRK on February 1994, as a step in fulfilling its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguard agreement and in honouring non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.”

“The Council requests the DPRK and ROK to renew discussions whose purpose is implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” (Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/13, 31 March 1994)

Joint US–Japan–Republic of Korea Trilateral Statement
“The three leaders agreed that North Korea’s program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea’s IAEA safeguards agreement and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The three leaders called upon North Korea to dismantle this program in a prompt and verifiable manner and to come into full compliance with all its international commitments in conformity with North Korea’s recent commitment in the Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. In this context, the three leaders agreed to continue close coordination.” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 26 October 2002)

Response of Target Country

3 July 1950
North Korean foreign minister sends note to UN accusing US government of “barefaced aggression” aimed at “imperialist domination” in Far East. Note reiterates North Korean contention that forces of South Korean President Syngman Rhee had been first to violate 38th parallel and that North Korean forces had crossed it only in “throwing back the enemy.” (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950–52: 10810)

DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement
"If [Washington] thinks it can get something by frightening us with strength, regarding pressure as an almighty solution, it is a mistake." (Washington Post, 13 February 1994, A29)

North Korean negotiator during bilateral talks at Panmunjom
When South Korean negotiator mentions possibility of economic sanctions, North Korean counterpart replies that "It does not matter what sanctions are applied against us. We are ready to respond with an eye for an eye and war for a war. Seoul is not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a sea of fire." (Financial Times, 21 March 1994, 1, 2; 22 March 1994, 6)

DPRK statement
Warns Japan publicly that should Japan “join force in any sanctions against us, we would regard it as a declaration of war and Japan would be unable to avoid a deserving punishment for it.” (New York Times, 10 June 1994, A11)

North Korean press release
“The Bush administration listed the D.P.R.K. as part of the “axis of evil” and a target of U.S. preemptive nuclear strikes. This was a clear declaration of war against the D.P.R.K. as it totally nullified the D.P.R.K. U.S. joint statement and agreed framework. …Its [United States’] reckless political, economic and military pressure is most seriously threatening the D.P.R.K.’s right to existence, creating a grave situation of the Korean Peninsula. …Nevertheless, the D.P.R.K., with great magnanimity, clarified that is was ready to seek a negotiated settlement of this issue on the following three questions: Firstly, if the U.S. recognizes the D.P.R.K.’s sovereignty; Secondly, if is assures the D.P.R.K. of non-aggression; and Thirdly, if the U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the D.P.R.K.” (New York Times, 26 October 2002, A8)

Pak Gil Yon, North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations:
“North Korea has ‘no intention to produce nuclear weapons’ but that any sanctions levied by the Security Council would be considered a declaration of war.” (Washington Post, 11 January 2003, A16)

Attitude of Other Countries

Soviet bloc nations
These countries deny validity of UN General Assembly arms embargo resolution, claiming motions of that sort can originate only in Security Council. ( New York Times , 19 May 1951, A3)

China

Shen Guofang, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman:
"China in principle does not subscribe to the involvement of the (UN) Security Council in the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula or the resort to sanctions to solve it." "We do not agree on sanctions, for sanctions will only serve to push the parties concerned into confrontation." (Washington Post, 10 January 1994, A1; 17 June 1994, A20)

Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng:
"China favors a proper settlement of the (nuclear) issue through dialogues and consultations, instead of imposing pressure and sanctions… We hold that denuclearization of the peninsula will be realized at an early date, for this will be not only conducive to peace and stability in the peninsula, but also in line with the common interests of both (North and South Korea) and beneficial to peace and stability in the region and in the world as a whole." (Washington Post, 27 December 1993, A13)

Anonymous Chinese diplomat
“We are not going to read the riot act to Kim Jong Il or engage in economic sanctions, because if his regime collapses all of Northeast Asia will face instability.” (Washington Post, 25 February 2003, A19)

Russia and China Joint statement
“The sides consider it important to preserve the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula and the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…In this context…(the two sides) stress the extreme importance of normalizing relations between the United States and the D.P.R.K. on the basis of continued observation of earlier reached agreements, including the framework agreement of 1994.” (New York Times, 3 December 2002, A12; Financial Times, 3 December 2002, 6)

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
“Attempts to isolate North Korea can only lead to a new escalation in tension.” (Washington Post, 31 December 2002, A14)

Russian Ambassador to South Korea
“Sanctions do not work either against North Korea, or against Iran, or against any other country”. (Mosnews.com, 7 March 2006)

South Korean President Kim Young Sam
“We must try to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We'd like to make our best efforts to solve the problems through dialogue… (But) if there is no change, we must resort to sanctions.” (Washington Post, 24 October 1993, C1)

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung
“Sanctions would likely lead to a repeat of the nuclear crisis in the early 1990’s.” (New York Times, 31 October 2002, A13)

President Kim Dae-Jung
“No policy of containment and isolation against communist countries has succeeded in history, even during the Cold War era.” (Financial Times, 31 December 2002, 1)

Japan
Government assembles a 10-point draft sanctions plan aimed at North Korea to meet US moves to punish Pyongyang in the UN for its nuclear weapons program. The document, obtained by Japanese press sources, includes bans on trade, air travel, and cash transfers. (Washington Post, 5 June 1994, A1)

Foreign Minister Taro Aso
“I know their [North Korea’s] first concern is the normalization of relations. However, there will be no settlement of the negotiations in this track unless they properly address the issues in other tracks including the abduction issue.[¹]” (MOFA, Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Friday, February 3, 2006, 9:25 a.m).

European Union
Commissioner for External Affairs Christopher Patten
“It is difficult in present circumstances to see how we can continue with our contributions [financial contributions to the constructions of two nuclear reactors] unless North Korea makes clear pretty rapidly that they are going to stop their attempts to develop nuclear weapons.” (New York Times, 22 October 2002, A6)

Legal Notes

Terms of the October 21, 1994 Nuclear Framework Agreement

General Terms and Conditions

• North Korea agrees to freeze its existing nuclear program under enhanced IAEA safeguards.
• Both sides agree to cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors with more proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWR).
• The two sides agree to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
• Both sides pledge to work together for peace and security on a nuclear free Korean peninsula.
• Both sides agree to work together to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Measures Related to the Relaxation of Economic Sanctions

• Authorizes transactions related to telecommunications connections, credit card use for personal or travel related transactions, and opening of journalist offices.
• Authorizes DPRK use of the US bank system to clear transactions not originating or terminating in the United States. Unblocks frozen assets where there is no DPRK government interest.
• Authorizes US imports of magnesite (a refractory material used in the US steel industry, North Korea and China are the world's primary sources of this raw material).
• Authorizes transactions related to future establishment of liaison offices; case by case participation of US companies in the light water reactor project, supply of alternative energy, and disposition of spent nuclear fuel as provided for by the Agreed Framework, in a manner consistent with applicable laws. (US Department of State, Background Notes—North Korea, 1996)

Note
1 The “tracks” in Japan and North Korea bilateral relation include: the abduction issue, nuclear and missile issues, and normalization talks.

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