sign up

Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism

<< Case Studies Index

Case 60-3
US v. Cuba (1960- : Castro)

| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Response to Target Country |
Attitude of Other Countries | Legal Notes | Economic Impact | Assessment |
Author's Summary | Bibliography |

Economic Impact

Observed Economic Statistics

Ship blacklisting policy increases Cuban freight costs, circa 1963, by $50 million annually (equal to about 15 percent of the value of trade with nonsocialist countries in that year). (Losman 28)

"One-quarter of the island's buses were out of operation for want of spare parts late in 1961. Only one-half of Cuba's 1,400 railroad passenger cars were functioning in 1962 ... The sugar industry was particularly affected, especially by the failure of the transport system and mill breakdowns ... By 1965 nine sugar mills had been cannibalized. Of the 161 mills existing in 1969 ..., [Mesa-Lago reports that] only 115 still functioned in April 1972 ..." (Losman 34)

US supplied 70 percent of Cuba's imports in 1958, 68 percent in 1959, only 4 percent in 1961. (Losman 21)

In February 1960, USSR agrees to buy 5 million tons of Cuban sugar over 5 years, extend long-term credit of $100 million at 2.5 percent interest, first step in aid program that entails Soviet assistance to Cuba of about $3.6 billion in next decade, corresponding Cuban trade deficit to USSR of $100 million to $300 million annually. (Doxey 37-40; Cuban Studies Program, app. C)

Estimated debt service (principal and interest) in 1971 is $131 million. (Losman 43, citing Economist Intelligence Unit)

Cuba experiences negative growth of 1.2 percent per year over 1960-71 period. (Losman 37, citing World Bank Atlas, 1973)

In the mid-1970s, a sharp rise in world sugar prices boosts Cuban hard-currency reserves and allows Cuba to increase trade with nonsocialist countries in the West. "The message to Western countries was clear: when possible Cuba chose to trade with the West." (Kaplowitz and Kaplowitz, 60)

In 1983, USSR is said to pay up to five times world price for Cuban sugar. "Such guaranteed Soviet purchases, along with [supply to Cuba of] 16 million metric tons of oil at $16 a barrel, help lift Soviet aid to a level Western economists put at about $4 billion this year, about a quarter of the Cuban gross national product. Cuban officials have told Western bankers that none of the Soviet aid goes for arms, which they said Moscow gives for free." Soviet official claims, "We find it hard to quantify the precise level of our aid to Cuba. But annually it amounts to between $2bn-$3bn which is lower than the Americans think." Other estimates put the value of Soviet subsidies as high as $6 billion annually. (Washington Post, 4 June 1983, A15; Financial Times, 3 March 1990, 6; Purcell 44)

According to US Treasury Department, trade between US foreign subsidiaries and Cuba averaged $260 million from 1982 to 1987. (Journal of Commerce, 12 April 1990, 5A)

Although USSR has reportedly suspended Cuba's payments on its $9 billion debt, report prepared for Cuba's Paris Club creditors indicates that it will restart payments in 1986. Cuba's total Soviet bloc debt is estimated to be $22 billion. (Washington Post, 5 June 1985, A29; New York Times, 5 June 1985, D1)

A 1988 study estimates that US embargo has cost US firms $30 billion in lost exports over 25 years. (Cuban Studies Program, 8)

USSR depends on Cuba for 33 percent of its sugar, 40 percent of its nickel, most of its citrus. (Financial Times, 3 March 1990, 6)

In April 1990, Cuba signs one-year trade agreement with the USSR; the two countries appoint "special committee … to study future economic ties, which the Soviets say they want to make more efficient." Soviets reportedly want to move to hard-currency-based trade within five years. (Wall Street Journal, 19 April 1990, A11)

Cuban officials estimate that US sanctions have cost its economy $15 billion from 1961 to 1991; Cuban Ambassador to the UN Fernando Remirez de Estenoz estimates that US sanctions cost Cuba $970 million in 1993. (Journal of Commerce, 1 November 1991, 3A; Washington Post, 27 October 1994, A18)

Foreign Minister Roberto Robaína reveals in 1993 that the shipping provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act are having a serious effect on the economy, particularly on food imports. (Jenkins and Haines, 42)

"The loss of East European markets and lower deliveries of Soviet oil after August 1990 caused a generalized crisis for the Cuban economy. With foreign exchange cut by around 80%, shortages of inputs, spare parts and capital were acute. The economy contracted by 34% from 1990 to 1994." (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, 1996-97, 11)

"The decision by the former CMEA countries to carry out their trade in convertible currency from 1991 threw Cuba's trading relations into disarray. By 1992 the value of total trade turnover (exports plus imports) between Cuba and the former Soviet bloc countries had fallen to only $830m, or roughly 8% of its 1989 level." (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, 1996-97, 34)

Subsidiaries of US companies exported $700 million to Cuba in 1990, up from an average of $270 million over the previous decade. (Kaplowitz and Kaplowitz, appendix; Journal of Commerce, 11 June 1992, 10A)

Cuba owes Japan $2 billion in loans, which have not been repaid since Japan rescheduled the debt in 1989. (Journal of Commerce, 14 December 1995, 2A)

Cuba hasn't serviced its $7 billion debt since July 1986, most of which is owed to Western governments. The Paris Club has not rescheduled this debt, either. An estimated $20 billion is owed to Russia, none of which has been paid. (US Department of State 1994, Background Notes-Cuba)

ING, the Dutch bank, whose subsidiaries have substantial interests in the US, has stopped financing the Cuban sugar industry and will not renew $30 million in loans to Cubazucar, the state-owned trading company. (Journal of Commerce, 16 July 1996, 5A)

If the president allows suits to go forward under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, about 700-800 US citizens and companies whose Cuban holdings were confiscated could file suits. After August 1, 1998, an estimated 430,000 naturalized US citizens of Cuban origin and their families could file suits. Total claims could exceed $100 billion. (Financial Times, 17 July 1996, 5)

Large investors in Cuba, such as Canadian mining company Sherritt International and Spain's Sol Melia hotel chain, have announced they plan to stay. Big nickel mining projects involving Australian and South African companies continue. It is difficult to find concrete evidence of companies disinvesting from Cuba as a direct result of the Helms-Burton law. However, Cuban officials admit that the US legislation "has frightened off some potential new investors, complicated foreign financing flows, and generally tightened Washington's economic and diplomatic squeeze" on Castro's government. (Financial Times, 12 March 1997, 6)

Sugar exports counted for over 75 percent of Cuban foreign currency earnings in 1989, and less than 20 percent in 1996. In 1996, international tourism earned the most hard currency ($1.35 billion), followed by sugar ($970 million), family remittances (estimated at $500 million), and nickel ($417 million). (Journal of Commerce, 25 August 1997, 5A)

Banco Nacional de Cuba reports that current transfers, a large portion of which is assumed to be remittances, increased from $255 million in 1993 to $310 million in 1994 and $532 million in 1995. (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC] 1996, 37)

Banco Nacional de Cuba reports $54 million, $563 million, $5 million of foreign direct investment for 1993, 1994, 1995 respectively. (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1997, 27)

The US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council (UCTEC), a private consultancy group based in Washington, reports that between 1990 and January 1997 a total of $5.3 billion in investments have been announced, out of which $707 million has been committed or delivered. (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1997, 27)

As of January 1998, Cuban net blocked assets, including accrued interest, in the US amount to $178.2 million. (US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC], Terrorist Assets Report, January 1998, 5)

Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage says the US embargo cost the Cuban economy a minimum of $800 million in 1998. (Journal of Commerce, 23 December 1998, 3A)

"Although it is difficult to assess the direct and indirect cost of this policy [the US embargo], a Cuban source, the Institute of Economic Research, estimates that between 1960 and 1992 the embargo damages were worth more than US$40 billion." (UN Economic Commission for Latin America 1997, 43)

"In the nineties, tourism has become the Cuban economy's most dynamic sector. In 1994 gross foreign-exchange earnings from tourism took first place, overtaking the sugar industry. In 1996 tourism accounted for 35% of exports of goods and services." (UN Economic Commission for Latin America 1997, 125)

John Hamilton, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: "[W]e estimate the embargo only adds 5-10 percent to Cuba's shipping costs, and there are few capital or other goods needed at this stage of Cuba's development that it cannot buy elsewhere. Today, the greatest cost to Cuba from the embargo is the revenue lost from our embargo on U.S. tourists to the island." (USIS, 30 March 1999)

John Hamilton: "Our efforts to discourage foreign investment in properties confiscated from U.S. citizens have helped slow the pace of investment in Cuba. ... As of December, we estimate foreigners have invested $1.7 billion in Cuba since 1990. The largest sector are telecommunications—with $650 million, mining—with $350 million, and tourism—with $200 million. We estimate foreigners have signed firm commitments to invest another $1.6 billion during the same period, of which tourism-related projects account for $950 million. These numbers show relatively modest growth since December 1995 when Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage announced that Cuba had received $2.1 billion in foreign investment, of which only half had been delivered." (USIS, 30 March 1999)

USITC: The Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions With Respect to Cuba (USITC 2001, xiv-xv) concludes the following:

“U.S. economic sanctions with respect to Cuba had a minimal overall historical impact on the U.S. economy…With most U.S. economic assets in Cuba expropriated by the Castro government during 1959-1960, the U.S. economic sanctions of October 1960 and comprehensive sanctions of February 1962 appear to have caused few additional costs for the U.S. economy. Even with massive economic assistance from the Soviet Union during 1960-89, Cuba remained a small global market relative to other Latin American countries.”

“…U.S. exports to Cuba in the absence of sanctions, based on average 1996-98 trade data, would have been approximately $658 million to $1.0 billion annually; this is equivalent to about 17 to 27 percent of Cuba’s total imports from the world, or less than 0.5 percent of total U.S. exports.”

“Estimated U.S. imports from Cuba in the absence of sanctions, based on average 1996-98 trade data and excluding sugar (U.S. sugar imports are government-regulated) would have been approximately $69 million to $146 million annually; this is equivalent to about 7 to 15 percent of total Cuban exports to the world, or less than 0.5 percent of total U.S. imports.”

“U.S. economic sanctions with respect to Cuba generally had a minimal overall historical impact on the Cuban economy. Cuba adjusted quickly to U.S. economic sanctions through political and economic the alliance [sic] with the Soviet bloc countries. Soviet economic assistance, which peaked at nearly $6 billion annually in the 1980s, largely offset any adverse effects of U.S. sanctions and enabled the Cuban economy to grow.”

“The loss of Soviet economic assistance after 1990 caused a severe downturn in the Cuban economy, bringing to the forefront longstanding inefficiencies in the Cuban economy. The loss of Soviet assistance eventually forced Cuba to introduce economic reforms to attract foreign investment, and selective economic liberalization to stimulate domestic production.”

“The Cuban Government estimates that the cumulative cost of U.S. economic sanctions on the Cuban economy was $67 billion through 1998, including such costs as reduced trade and tourism, higher shipping costs, inability to procure spare parts, frozen bank accounts, foreign debt problems, and emigration of skilled workers. That estimate does not factor in the cumulative value of Soviet bloc economic assistance provided since 1960.”

“The estimated current impact of U.S. sanctions with respect to Cuba on U.S. output, employment, and wages, is negligible, primarily because of the small size of the Cuban economy relative to the U.S. economy.”

Cuba: structure of merchandise trade, 1989 and 1994 (percent of total trade)

	1989	1994
Europe	87.7	45.1
USSR & Eastern Europe	79.1	12.1
EU	6.7	29.8
Rest of Europe	1.9	3.2
Asia	5.7	14.0
Americas	5.7	34.7
Rest of World	0.9	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 1996-1997, 34.

Cuba: Foreign Trade, 1959-67 (millions of dollars)

	Exports		Imports
Year	Socialist share	Total	Socialist share	Total
1959	14	638	2	675
1960	150	618	119	638
1961	458	625	492	703
1962	427	521	629	759
1963	366	544	704	867
1964	422	714	687	1,019
1965	538	686	657	865
1966	482	592	739	926
1967	581	715	783	990

Source: Losman 25

Calculated Economic Impact (annual cost to target country)

1961-73a
Increased freight costs caused by US ship blacklisting policy, diversion of trade; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of average annual value of trade with nonsocialist economies	$50 million
Reduction in purchasing power associated with shift in trade to countries with nonconvertible currencies; welfare loss estimated at 30 percent of total trade with those countries	$400 million
Offset
Compensatory aid flows from USSR; welfare gain estimated at 70 percent of transfers	($270 million)
Average total, 1960-73	$180 million
1975-89
Reduction in purchasing power associated with shift in trade to countries with nonconvertible currencies; welfare loss estimated at 30 percent of total trade with those countries	$2,850 million
Offset
Compensatory aid flows from USSR; welfare gain estimated at 70 percent of transfers	($2,715 million)
Average total, 1975-89	$135 million
Average total, 1961-89	$150 million
1990-95
Loss of trade due to embargo and Soviet collapse, welfare loss estimated as 30 percent of drop in average annual value of trade in 1992-95 compared to 1985-87	$3,200 million
Offset
Remittances from Cubans living abroadb	($350 million)
Average total, 1990-95	$2,850 million

Notes:
a. Data for 1974 are excluded because a sudden increase in the world price for sugar sharply and temporarily increased the value of Cuban trade.
b. Most remittances from the US to Cuba are transferred illegally, and estimates of the total value range widely. The estimate used here is an average of "current transfers" for 1993-95 as reported by the National Bank of Cuba and could well include hard-currency inflows from many other sources (for example, unrecorded loans or receipts from drug trafficking or money laundering). Assuming no offsetting dollar flows would raise the estimated cost as a percentage of Cuba's GNP to 15.8 percent, but would not change the order of magnitude of the cost, which is well above the average for other cases.

Relative Magnitudes

Gross indicators of Cuban economy
Cuban GNP (1958) Cuban population (1958)	$2.6 billion 6.8 million
Cuban GDPa (1980) Cuban population (1980)	$14 billion 10 million
Cuban GDPb (1990) Cuban population (1990)	$20.3 billion 10.6 million
Annual effect of sanctions on gross indicators
Percentage of GDP:    1961-73c    1975-88d    1990-95e	6.9 percent 1.0 percent 14.0 percent
Per capita:    1958    1980    1990	$26.47 $13.50 $268.87
Cuba's trade with US as a percentage of total trade
Exports (1960) Imports (1960)	58 35
Ratio of 1958 US GDP ($450 billion) to Cuban GDP	173
Ratio of 1990 US GDP ($5,744 billion) to Cuban GDP	283

Notes:
a. Calculated using a 1989 GDP estimate in dollar value adjusted by Cuban GDP growth rate during the 1980s.
b. Calculated using estimated 1989 GDP in dollar value and 1990 Cuban output growth.
c. Calculated using 1958 Cuban GNP.
d. Calculated using estimated 1980 GDP.
e. Calculated using estimated 1990 GDP.

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, 1980, 1988, 1996; Zimbalist, 128.

Assessment

Margaret P. Doxey
"The OAS policy of economic denial has retarded, though it cannot entirely prevent, Cuba's economic development. More important still-and is this perhaps its main justification now?—it has made more difficult the export of revolution ..." (Doxey 40, citing "Viator," 320-21)

Donald L. Losman
"Cyrus Vance, U.S. Secretary of State, has termed the embargo a 'failure'." (Losman 44) "In summary, the embargo has been quite economically damaging, although much of its incidence has been shifted to the socialist bloc. Its political results, on the other hand, have been questionable." (Losman 46)

Jorge I. Domínguez
"Prior to the Cuban Democracy Act Castro's regime had become internationally isolated. It has since been able to construct a large and heterogeneous coalition to defend itself. US penalties on firms in third countries have provoked protests from nearly all the major US allies and trading partners ... The act is politically counterproductive and economically ineffective ... What better gift could Cuban hard-liners have received?" (Domínguez, 104)

Marifeli Perez-Stable, Director, Cuban Committee for Democracy
"Advocates of spiraling economic sanctions are myopic ... Castro has learned to thrive in the face of US hostility, whereas sudden openness would at this point prove his undoing. Lifting the embargo unilaterally is not the only—though it would be the boldest—course. Rescinding the bans on travel and the sale of food and medicine would do for a start. Since US sanctions are not the principal cause of the island's economic crisis, why not ease them to unmask the Cuban government's spurious claim that they are?" (Washington Post, 14 April 1995, A21)

Susan Kaufman Purcell
"During the past 36 years, the strongest supporters of economic sanctions against Cuba have hoped, if not believed, that the sanctions would lead to the overthrow of the Castro regime. Measured against these goals, the sanctions clearly have failed. Measured against the less ambitious goal of transforming the behavior of the Castro government, however, the sanctions have produced mixed results ... They have not been definitive in explaining recent changes in Cuban economic policy. They have, however, helped exacerbate Cuba's hard-currency crisis, thereby adding to the pressures on the Cuban leader to liberalize parts of the economy." (Purcell 52-53)

Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers
"We believe that U.S. policy toward Cuba during the Cold War has sought to achieve many goals, ranging from the overthrow of the current regime to the containment of the Soviet empire. Not all these goals were achieved ... Still, we believe that U.S. policy toward Cuba, including the embargo, has enjoyed real though not total success ... The dominant goal of U.S. policy toward Cuba during the Cold War was to prevent the advance of Cuban-supported communism in this [Western] hemisphere ... The emergence of democracy throughout the hemisphere, the loss of Soviet support, sustained U.S. pressure, and Cuba's own economic woes forced the Cuban regime to renounce its support of armed revolutionary groups. Containment has succeeded, and the era when it needed to be the organizing principle of U.S. policy towards Cuba has ended." (Aronson and Rogers, 1-2)

Author's Summary

Destabilization
Overall assessment	1960-89	1990-present
Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success)	1	2
Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (none) to 4 (significant)	1	2
Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution)scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success)	1	4
Political and economic variables
Companion policies J (covert), Q (quasi-military), R (regular military)	J,Q	-
International cooperation with sender	2	1
International assistance to target A (if present)	A	-
Cooperating international organizations	OAS	-
Sanction period (years)	29	16+
Economic health and political stability of target, scaled from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong)	2	2
Presanction relations between sender and target, scaled from 1 (antagonistic) to 3 (cordial)	1	1
Regime type of target, scaled from 1 (authoritarian) to 3 (democratic)	1	1
Type of sanction X (export), M (import), F (financial)	X,M,F	X,M,F
Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss)	3	3
Disruption of Military Adventures
Overall assessment		1960–89
Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success)		4
Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (none) to 4 (significant)		2
Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution)scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success)		8
Political and economic variables
Companion policies J (covert), Q (quasi-military), R (regular military)		J,Q
International cooperation with sender		2
International assistance to target A (if present)		A
Cooperating international organizations		OAS
Sanction period (years)		29
Economic health and political stability of target, scaled from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong)		2
Presanction relations between sender and target, scaled from 1 (antagonistic) to 3 (cordial)		1
Regime type of target, scaled from 1 (authoritarian) to 3 (democratic)		1
Type of sanction X (export), M (import), F (financial)		X,M,F
Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss)		3

Comments

The overriding goal of US policy toward Cuba for nearly 40 years has been to destabilize the Castro regime, and that goal was not achieved as of early 1999. The US imposed significant costs on the Cuban economy with its trade and financial embargo. Yet because the USSR was willing to assume a large portion of those costs, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the embargo may have exerted a counterproductive effect on Castro and may have helped consolidate his position in Cuba.

There was more success in this earlier pre-1990 phase toward the secondary goal of containing the export of revolution by Cuba. But sanctions against Cuba had little to do with the failure of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua or the decision to withdraw Cuban troops from Africa. Those successes had more to do with US military and economic support for counterrevolutionary forces, the waning of revolutionary fervor within Cuba as casualties in Africa mounted, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which undercut popular support for socialist revolutionary movements around the world.

With the dismantling of the USSR in 1990-91, massive subsidies to Cuba were lost, and the combined effects of the embargo and economic mismanagement have been severe. Also, with the end of the Cold War, democratization, pro-market economic reforms, and the return of nationalized property have become relatively more important goals, but it is difficult to disentangle these goals from that of removing Castro. For example, while the Helms-Burton Act states that the policy of the United States is "to support the self-determination of the Cuban people" and "to encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves with a government which reflects" that self-determination, a subsequent provision in the Act explicitly bars any role for Fidel Castro or his brother Raúl in any future government before the sanctions can be lifted.

There have been limited economic reforms and some loosening of political restrictions in this latter period. The Castro government has permitted some small-scale private enterprises to operate legally, and in January 1998 it permitted Pope John Paul II to visit and to perform a public mass. These limited reforms have been at least in part motivated by a need to attract offsetting trade and investment from Europe and elsewhere, but political opposition is still repressed and Castro remains firmly in control.

Bibliography

Aronson, Bernhard W., and William D. Rogers. 1999. U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century. Report of the Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Barber, James. 1979. Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument. International Affairs 55 (July): 367-84.

Bender, Lynn D. 1975. The Politics of Hostility: Castro's Revolution and United States Policy. Hato Rey, PR: Inter-American Press.

Bonsal, Philip. 1971. Cuba, Castro, and the United States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Congressional Research Service (CRS). 2006. “Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress.” By Mark P. Sullivan. CRS report RL32730, updated 23 January 2006. Washington DC: Library of Congress.

Cuban Studies Program. 1988. Opportunities for U.S.-Cuban Trade. Washington: The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, June.

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act. 1996. House of Representatives. 104th Congress, 2nd session.

Domínguez, Jorge I. 1993. Secrets of Castro's Staying Power. Foreign Affairs 72, (Spring): 97-107.

Doxey, Margaret P. 1980. Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Enders, Thomas O. 1981. Tasks for US Policy in the Hemisphere. US Department of State, Current Policy, no. 282, 3 June.

Hermann, A. H. 1982. Conflicts of National Laws with International Business Activity: Issues of Extraterritoriality. London: British-North American Committee.

Jenkins, Gareth, and Lila Haines. 1994. Cuba: Prospects for reform, trade, and investment. Economist Intelligence Unit.

Kaplowitz, Donna Rich, and Michael Kaplowitz. 1992. New Opportunities for U.S.-Cuban Trade. Washington: Cuban Studies Program, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 1975.

Krinsky, Michael, and David Golove. 1993. United States Economic Measures against Cuba: Proceedings in the United Nations and International Law Issues. Northampton, MA: Aletheia Press.

Losman, Donald L. 1979. International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Lowenfeld, Andreas F. 1977. " ... 'Sauce for the Gander': The Arab Boycott and United States Political Trade Controls." Texas International Law Journal 12: 25-39.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, ed. 1971. Revolutionary Change in Cuba. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Newfarmer, Richard, ed. 1982. "Relations with Cuba." In From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New Policies for Latin America. Papers prepared for the Democratic Policy Committee, US Senate, June. Washington.

Purcell, Susan Kaufman. 1998. "Cuba." In Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard N. Haass. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Roca, Sergio. 1987. "Economic Sanctions against Cuba." In The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, ed. David Leyton-Brown. London: Croom Helm.

Schreiber, Anna P. 1973. "Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Economic Measures against Cuba and the Dominican Republic." World Politics 25 (April): 387-413.

Shultz, George P. 1983. "Strengthening Democracy in Central America." US Department of State, Current Policy, no. 468, 16 March.

Szulc, Tad, and Karl E. Meyer. 1962. The Cuban Invasion: Chronicle of a Disaster. New York: Praeger.

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 1997. Cuba: Evolucion Economica Durante 1996. Washington.

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Forthcoming. La Economía Cubana: Reformas Structurales y Desempeño en los Noventa. Washington.

"Viator." 1970. Cuba Revisited after Ten Years of Castro. Foreign Affairs 48 (January): 312-21.

Zimbalist, Andrew. 1993. The Cost of the United States Embargo and Its Extraterritorial Application to the Cuban Economy. In United States Economic Measures against Cuba, ed. Michael Krinsky and David Golove. Northampton, MA: Aletheia Press.

<< top of page