Main Points

1) The US and global economy continues the process of slow and difficult recovery from the financial crisis of 2008. Financial markets can easily become unsettled. A serious sovereign debt crisis remains unresolved in Europe’s euro area. There are potential risks on the horizon for countries such as Japan, China, and Brazil.

2) In this context, continuing uncertainty around the US federal budget in general and the debt ceiling in particular is not helpful—and may prove destabilizing both at home and around the world. Another round of confrontation over the debt ceiling, for example in the early fall of 2013, would not be helpful to growth or employment.

3) At the same time, a sudden move towards further tightening of fiscal policy in the United States would undermine our economic recovery and has the potential to destabilize financial markets. We are currently moving in a precipitate manner towards an excessive and inappropriate degree of immediate austerity.

4) There is no meaningful evidence that we “need” to cut federal deficits dramatically this year or next year, or even over the next five years. There is no threshold for our federal debt, either gross or net, that would necessarily trigger slower growth or higher bond yields or any other economic problem.

5) It is far more important to get the economy back onto a sustainable growth path—and this includes not disrupting the private sector with damaging or disruptive public spending cuts. As the economy recovers, this will strengthen tax revenues and help put the budget back on to a more sustainable footing—and there are early indications in 2013 that this is exactly what is happening.

6) The ongoing sequester is a perfect example of how not to manage fiscal policy, particularly as this tends to undermine all forms of investment in and by the public sector. Combined with repeated confrontations over the debt ceiling and the possibility of a government shutdown, arbitrary and across-the-board spending cuts are hardly likely to help boost growth either in the short term or the longer term. Nor do they help boost confidence in the private sector.
Now is a good time to discuss longer-term issues that will drive budget outcomes in future decades, particularly the paramount importance of the likely rising cost of healthcare (meaning all healthcare costs, not just those paid by the government). But this potentially sensible debate about healthcare has become very confused and shows no signs of improvement.

Significantly cutting federal discretionary domestic spending below current projected levels will weaken our education system, undermine our future human capital, and further fray our physical infrastructure—i.e., actually reduce attainable growth rates in the United States. This is not a good time to squeeze the provision of essential public goods.

More broadly, the rhetoric around supposedly “excessive” government spending has itself become excessive. The long-standing project to shrink the federal government—sometimes known as a strategy of “starve the beast”—has reached a new and very dangerous phase.¹

There is a danger that we will inflict upon ourselves an unnecessary and damaging degree of austerity. We should instead be building an economy within which federal revenue can be robust and public spending growth can be contained over the next decade.

A separate, but very important, issue is how to limit total healthcare spending—not just the government component of healthcare spending—as a percent of GDP over the next 20 to 50 years.

Do We Face a “Fiscal Crisis”?  

Standard solvency analysis—including, for example, the tools used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—confirms there is no prospect of an immediate fiscal crisis in the United States. We currently have “fiscal space,” in the sense that there will be strong global demand for Treasury obligations for the foreseeable future.²

Long-term interest rates are low and remarkably stable. Partly this is due to actions by the Fed through various forms of “quantitative easing,” but US government securities are also seen as a safe haven for international investors. However, this safe haven status will be jeopardized if markets perceive a significant probability that we will not pay our debts as contracted—or if we create the perception that our economy will be thrown into repeated turmoil through regular showdowns over the debt ceiling or through dramatic cuts in government spending.

Over the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) 10-year forecast window, with the partial expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts, there is no insurmountable budget problem.³ There is no fiscal emergency over this time horizon.

Our most important budget problems come after the 10-year horizon, because Medicare spending accelerates due to an aging population and increasing health care costs. The real issue here is containing healthcare costs—i.e., schemes that cut Medicare in such a way as to shift

¹ For more historical background and relevant details on the development of this strategy since the 1970s, see chapter 3 in White House Burning.
³ See James Kwak, “The Weirdness of 10-Year Deficit Reduction.”
healthcare costs onto families do not offer an appealing solution, particularly as this would likely raise healthcare spending as a percent of GDP.\footnote{For more detail, see the CBO assessment of the budget proposal put forward by Congressman Paul Ryan.}

We should aim to find a way to limit healthcare costs as soon as possible—every year of high healthcare cost inflation makes the problem worse. Our competitors are controlling healthcare costs much more effectively than we are; with the set of advanced countries, the United States stands out as having the worst (highest) projections for rising healthcare costs through 2030 or 2050.\footnote{See the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor (October 2012), statistical table 12a, columns 3 and 4.}

The United States is in the midst of a significant demographic transition, in the sense that our population is ageing. We need to invest in education and ensure access to affordable healthcare to everyone if we are to increase productivity as the proportion of older Americans increases. Ultimately, higher productivity is necessary—although not sufficient—to ensure that older, retired workers can receive a sustainable level of reasonable benefits (including pensions and healthcare).

In this context and over the coming decades, the United States needs to make a longer-term fiscal adjustment. An important part of that should include additional tax revenues.\footnote{For more details on the viable options, see White House Burning, particularly chapter 7. Reducing tax expenditures is part of the sensible route to follow. These reductions can be phased in gradually.} The Bush-era tax cuts reduced revenue to an excessive degree, given the ageing of society. We are still struggling to recover from that flawed way of thinking about our public finances.

It is striking the extent to which income inequality has increased dramatically since the last tax reform in 1986, primarily due to the impact of information technology and globalization on incomes—helping top earners and squeezing people in the middle of the income and skill distribution.\footnote{For more details and discussion of what accounts for the increase in inequality, see David Autor and Daron Acemoglu, “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings.”} According to the latest available data, from 1993 to 2011, average real income for the bottom 99 percent of the population (by income) rose by 5.8 percent, while the top 1 percent experienced real income growth of 57.5 percent. The top 1 percent captured 62 percent of all income growth over this period.\footnote{This is from data on Emmanuel Saez’s website, downloaded on March 12, 2013. See the first item under “Income and Wealth Inequality”; the link to his spreadsheet is called “Tables and Figures Updated to 2011 in Excel format, January 2013.”}

The returns to higher education have greatly increased in recent decades and, on average, there are not good income prospects for anyone with only a high school education (or less). If anything, the tax system should lean towards becoming more progressive—and investing the proceeds in public goods that are not sufficiently provided by the private sector, like early childhood education and the kind of preventive healthcare that helps prevent disruption to education (e.g., due to childhood asthma).

At the same time, we must not lose sight of the very large fiscal risks posed by the nature and structure of our financial system. Our worsening budget picture since 2000 is due to a combination of factors—including large tax cuts, two foreign wars, and the introduction of Medicare Part D. The recent increase in government spending as a percent of GDP is due almost
entirely to the way the financial sector imploded and damaged the rest of the private sector in 2007–08.9

To see the fiscal impact of the last finance-induced recession, look at changes in the CBO’s baseline projections over time. In January 2008, the CBO projected that total government debt in private hands—the best measure of what the government owes—would fall to $5.1 trillion by 2018 (23 percent of GDP). As of January 2010, the CBO projected that over the next eight years debt will rise to $13.7 trillion (over 65 percent of GDP)—a difference of $8.6 trillion.

Most of this fiscal impact is not due to the Troubled Assets Relief Program—and definitely not due to the part of that program which injected capital into failing banks. Of the change in CBO baseline, 57 percent is due to decreased tax revenues resulting from the financial crisis and recession; 17 percent is due to increases in discretionary spending, some of it the stimulus package necessitated by the financial crisis (and because the “automatic stabilizers” in the United States are relatively weak); and another 14 percent is due to increased interest payments on the debt—because we now have more debt.10

We should be attempting to strengthen the safeguards in the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation. Repealing or rolling back that legislation poses a major fiscal risk.11 The fact that this is not currently scored by the Congressional Budget Office does not reduce this risk or make it any smaller.

In effect, a financial system with dangerously low capital levels—hence prone to major collapses—creates a nontransparent contingent liability for the federal budget in the United States.12 This can only lead to further instability, deep recessions, and damage to our fiscal balance sheet, in a version of what senior officials at the Bank of England refer to as a “doom loop.”

The remainder of this testimony reviews in more detail: why spending cuts—either from a government shutdown or from some other form of immediate austerity—will be contractionary in the current US context; and how to think about our debt levels in a cross-country perspective.

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9 Over the past decade, foreign wars also contributed to increased government spending. But the negative fiscal effect of the financial crisis was much larger than the cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.

10 See also the May 2010 edition of the IMF’s cross-country fiscal monitor for comparable data from other industrialized countries. The box on debt dynamics shows that mostly these are due to the recession; fiscal stimulus only accounts for one-tenth of the increase in debt in advanced G-20 countries. Table 4 in that report compares support by the government for the financial sector across leading countries; the United States provided more capital injection (as a percent of GDP) but lower guarantees relative to Europe.


12 See Anat Admati, Peter DeMarzo, Martin Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer, “Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive,” Stanford University, March 2011 (revised). For a comprehensive assessment of banking and why capital requirements should be significantly higher, see Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It (Princeton University Press, 2013).
Spending Cuts Would Be Contractionary

Immediate spending cuts would, by themselves, likely slow the economy. The IMF’s comprehensive recent review of cross-country evidence concludes: “A budget cut equal to 1 percent of GDP typically reduces domestic demand by about 1 percent and raises the unemployment rate by 0.3 percentage point.”

The contractionary effects of spending cuts can sometimes be offset by other changes in economic policy or conditions, but these are unlikely to apply in the United States today.

If there is high perceived sovereign default risk, fiscal contraction can potentially lower long-term interest rates. But the United States is currently perceived as one of the lowest risk countries in the world—hence the widespread use of the US dollar as a reserve asset. To the extent there is pressure on long-term interest rates in the United States today due to fiscal concerns, these are mostly about the longer-term issues involving healthcare spending; if this spending were to be credibly constrained (e.g., in plausible projections for 2030 or 2050), long rates should fall. In contrast, cutting discretionary spending would have little impact on the market assessment of our longer-term fiscal stability.

It is also highly unlikely that short-term spending cuts would directly boost confidence among households or firms in the current US situation, particularly with employment still around 2 percent below its pre-crisis level. The United States still has a significant “output gap” between actual and potential GDP, so unemployment is significantly above the achievable rate. Fiscal contractions rarely inspire confidence in such a situation.

If monetary policy becomes more expansionary while fiscal policy contracts, this can offset to some degree the negative short-run effects of spending cuts on the economy. But in the United States today, short-term interest rates are as low as they can be and the Federal Reserve has already engaged in a substantial amount of “quantitative easing” to bring down interest rates on longer-term debt. It is unclear that much more monetary policy expansion would be advisable or possible in the view of the Fed, even if unemployment increases again—for example because fiscal contraction involves laying off government workers.

Tighter fiscal policy and easier monetary policy can, in small open economies with flexible exchange rates, push down (depreciate) the relative value of the currency—thus increasing exports and making it easier for domestic producers to compete against imports. But this is unlikely to happen in the United States, in part because other industrialized countries are also undertaking fiscal policy consolidation. Also, the preeminent reserve currency status of the dollar means that it rises and falls in response to world events outside our control—and at present political and economic instabilities elsewhere seem likely to keep the dollar relatively strong.

The available evidence, including international experience, suggests it is very unlikely that the United States could experience an “expansionary fiscal contraction” as a result of short-term cuts.

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13 World Economic Outlook, October 2010, chapter 3, “Will It Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Consolidation,” page 113. This study has important methodological advantages, in particular because it focuses on policy intentions and attempts to implement spending cuts and revenue increases. For more on the IMF’s thinking on fiscal policy—and how it has been unable to provide sufficient support to the economic recovery—see the recent work of Prakash Lougani, including “Tackling Unemployment: Return of the Two-Handed Approach,” and the links provided within.
in discretionary federal government spending. Recent experience with austerity in the United Kingdom should also not inspire us to head rapidly in the same direction.

**Fiscal Crises in Comparative Perspective**

The advisable debt limit, relative to GDP, for the United States is subject to considerable debate and is not knowable with a high degree of precision. For a country like the United States—issuing debt in its own currency and with its assets widely regarded as a safe haven—there is no precise debt-to-GDP level at which a crisis is necessarily triggered. Higher debt levels, however, do constitute a source of vulnerability, particularly when foreign investors are holding a substantial proportion of the debt outstanding.\(^\text{14}\)

If any shock throws the economy into recession, fiscal policy in most industrialized countries will to some degree automatically counteract the effect—as spending increases (on unemployment benefits and other forms of social support) and taxation declines (as GDP falls). Such automatic stabilizers are generally helpful as they prevent the recession from becoming more serious—or even some form of prolonged collapse, which was the pre-1945 experience of many countries.

It is important not to oversimplify fiscal concerns into precise cut-offs for “dangerous” debt levels. Recent European experience provides ample illustration that countries can run into trouble refinancing their debts at a wide range of debt-to-GDP values.

Greece ran into trouble in 2010 with gross debt relative to GDP of 147.9 percent; its debt levels in 2006 and 2007 were around 107 percent.\(^\text{15}\) This is a classic case of too much debt by any measure—although the full extent of the debt and underlying deficits were not completely clear until market perceptions shifted against Greece. In addition, an important part of the problems in Greece is structural—both in terms of how the euro area functions as a monetary area, and in terms of the longer-run failure of productivity to converge towards levels in northern, higher-income European countries.

Portugal faced a fiscal crisis with gross debt at 108.0 percent of GDP in 2011, but its gross debt was only 68.3 percent of GDP in 2007. The issue for Portugal is low achieved and expected growth relative to fiscal deficits—the markets have become unwilling to support debt that continues to increase as a percent of GDP.

Ireland, another euro area country that currently has an IMF program, is a different kind of fiscal disaster. In this case, the on-balance-sheet government debt was low (25.0 percent of GDP in 2007 for general government gross debt) but there was a big buildup in off-balance-sheet obligations—in the form of implicit support available to a banking system that was taking on large risks. Bailing out the banks in fall 2008 and losing tax revenue due to severe recession

\(^\text{14}\) Statistical table 12a in the IMF’s *Fiscal Monitor*, April 2013, reports “nonresident holding of marketable central government debt” for the third quarter of 2012. For the United States this is 55.1 percent.

\(^\text{15}\) These data are from the latest available *Fiscal Monitor*, published by the IMF in April 2013 (); see statistical table 4. International comparisons of fiscal accounts are difficult; we recommend using the gross general government debt numbers from the IMF’s *Fiscal Monitor*. 
pushed up gross debt to 106.5 percent of GDP in 2011 and debt levels will reach over 120 percent of GDP (in the official IMF estimates) before stabilizing.

In the United Kingdom, gross debt was 43.0 percent of GDP in 2006, which was low relative to other industrialized countries at that time. Gross general government debt reached 79.4 percent of GDP in 2010, when the new conservative government decided to adopt relatively austere budget policies. However, growth since that time has been lackluster and debt continues on an upward path, reaching 90.3 percent of GDP in 2012 and expected to reach 93.6 percent in 2013. In the latest IMF projections, it will peak at 100.7 percent of GDP in 2016. Given that Britain does not belong to the euro area and still has its own central bank, the wisdom of its current fiscal policy stance has increasingly been called into question.

Compared with other industrialized countries, Japan stands out as an extreme. Government debt relative to GDP is expected to reach 245.4 percent in 2013 (on a gross basis) and stay above 240 percent of GDP for the foreseeable future. On a net basis—taking out government debt held by other parts of the public sector—debt is expected to be 146.7 percent of GDP in 2013 and to remain above 150 percent of GDP through at least 2018. But over 90 percent of Japanese government debt is held by residents—and, at least for the time being, Japanese household and business savings remain high.\(^\text{16}\)

Countries with greater reliance on foreign savers, such as the United States (where nonresidents held 32.1 percent of general government debt and 55.1 percent of marketable central government debt in 2012) and the United Kingdom (nonresidents held 31.9 percent of general government debt in 2012) need to be much more careful. Within the euro area, as a result of greater financial integration combined with the mispricing of risk, foreigners typically hold 40 to 90 percent of all outstanding government debt (mostly held by other euro area financial institutions).

The increase in debt relative to GDP in industrialized countries was from 77.2 percent in 2006 to 110.7 percent in 2012 (this is general government gross debt as a percent of GDP, calculated by the IMF as an unweighted average across countries).\(^\text{17}\) Most of this increase was due to automatic stabilizers, i.e., the increase in spending and fall in taxation that occurs whenever a country goes into recession.

Seen in that context, the increase in the US general government gross debt—from 66.1 percent of GDP in 2006 to 98.2 percent at the end of 2010 and 106.5 percent at the end of 2012—was very much in line with experience in other countries.\(^\text{18}\)

In terms of net general government debt held by the private sector, at the end of 2012, the United States was around 89.0 percent of GDP—up from 48.4 in 2007. This number will rise to 87.6 percent in 2016 and 86.6 percent in 2018, according to the IMF. This is unlikely to cause any kind of serious fiscal crisis.

\(^{16}\) In table 12a of the IMF’s *Fiscal Monitor, April 2013*, nonresident holding of general government debt in 2012 is 8.9 percent of all such debt.

\(^{17}\) This series is from the IMF’s *Fiscal Monitor, October 2012*; it is not available in the April 2013 version of this publication.

\(^{18}\) These gross and net debt numbers are taken from the IMF’s *Fiscal Monitor, April 2013*, statistical table 4.
In the Congressional Budget Office’s longer-term projections, the future costs of healthcare cause a rise in debt to Japanese levels or beyond by 2030 or 2050. But the issue there is rising healthcare costs as a percent of GDP—not just the government component of those costs.

The role of the US dollar as the world’s preeminent reserve currency means there is a strong demand for our government securities in the foreseeable future. In 1948 and in 1968, world holdings of US dollar assets in the form of reserves were worth about 2 percent of GDP. Now world reserve holdings of dollar assets are worth at least 15 percent of GDP—and some would put this as high as 30 percent of GDP.19

But it is not clear how far this will carry us—particularly as alternative reserve assets typically develop in a diverse world economy with competing national interests. It would be wise to undertake medium-term fiscal consolidation, i.e., over the next two decades. Rising healthcare costs, a weak tax base, and deteriorating public goods could well undermine our long-term potential growth—as well as our ability to ensure that all Americans can participate in economic prosperity.

In addition, the United States continues to face very large potential fiscal liabilities in the form of implicit support available to the financial sector, both directly—if “too big to fail” global banks get into trouble—and indirectly, in the form of automatic stabilizers that will always kick in when the economy declines sharply due to a banking crisis (e.g., through the decline in tax revenue when economic activity contracts).

If a financial crisis due to the mispricing of risk causes a fiscal crisis, including immediate spending cuts and tax increases, this has major distributional consequences. The financial sector executives and traders who do well during a financial boom are highly paid; typically this is on a return-on-equity basis without appropriate adjustment for risk, so they take on too much debt. When the downside risks materialize, the costs of the crisis are borne by those who lose jobs and suffer other collateral damage.

If sharp spending cuts follow that reduce essential public services (e.g., Head Start or other government-supported education programs), this effectively transfers the costs of dangerous compensation schemes for the financial elite onto the middle class and relatively poor people.20

There is nothing pro-market or pro-private sector about an inefficient redistribution scheme that allows a few people to become richer due to implicit government subsidies for “too big to fail” global financial institutions. Such firms are likely to damage themselves with some regularity—their executives have little incentive to be sufficiently cautious. If the consequent crises undermine public goods, such as access to effective education and quality healthcare, this is likely to permanently lower growth rates through undermining the human capital of the US workforce. Unfortunately, this is the trajectory on which we currently find ourselves.

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19 For more details on the rise of the dollar as a reserve currency amidst the evolution of the international monetary system, see chapter 2 in *White House Burning*.